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


# Rapport 2019
# de la RAND Corporation

**Étirer**
**et déséquilibrer la Russie.**


BRIEF

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# Overextending and Unbalancing Russia

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF COST-IMPOSING OPTIONS

This brief summarizes a report that comprehensively examines nonviolent, cost-imposing options that the United States and its allies could pursue across economic, political, and military areas to stress—overextend and unbalance—Russia's economy and armed forces and the regime's political standing at home and abroad. Some of the options examined are clearly more promising than others, but any would need to be evaluated in terms of the overall U.S. strategy for dealing with Russia, which neither the report nor this brief has attempted to do.

# Étendre et déséquilibrer la Russie

Évaluation de l'impact des options coûteuses

**Ce rapport examine en détail les options non violentes et coûteuses que les États-Unis et leurs alliés pourraient poursuivre** dans les domaines économiques, politiques et militaires **pour mettre à rude épreuve – surétendre et déséquilibrer – l'économie et les forces armées de la Russie et la position politique du régime dans son pays et à l'étranger.**

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

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- **Emirats Arabes Unis**
- **Royaume-Uni**

- **OTAN** (Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord)
- **OCDE** (Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economique)
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

The maxim that "Russia is never so strong nor so weak as it appears" remains as true in the current century as it was in the 19th and 20th.

Today's Russia suffers from many *vulnerabilities*—oil and gas prices well below peak that have caused a drop in living standards, economic sanctions that have furthered that decline, an aging and soon-to-be-declining population, and increasing authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin's now-continued rule. Such vulnerabilities are coupled with deep-seated (if exaggerated) *anxieties* about the possibility of Western-inspired regime change, loss of great power status, and even military attack.

Despite these vulnerabilities and anxieties, Russia remains a powerful country that still manages to be a U.S. peer competitor in a few key domains. Recognizing that some level of competition with Russia is inevitable, RAND researchers conducted a qualitative assessment of "cost-imposing options" that could unbalance and overextend Russia. Such cost-imposing options could place new burdens on Russia, ideally heavier burdens than would be imposed on the United States for pursuing those options.

The work builds on the concept of long-term strategic competition developed during the Cold War, some of which originated at RAND. A seminal 1972 RAND report posited that the United States needed to shift its strategic thinking away from trying to stay ahead of the Soviet Union in all dimensions and toward trying to control the competition and channel it into areas of U.S. advantage. If this shift could be made successfully, the report concluded, the United States could prompt the Soviet Union to shift its limited resources into areas that posed less of a threat.

The new report applies this concept to today's Russia. A team of RAND experts developed economic, geopolitical, ideological, informational, and military options and qualitatively assessed them in terms of their likelihood of success in extending Russia, their benefits, and their risks and costs.



La maxime selon laquelle « la Russie n'est jamais aussi forte ni aussi faible qu'il n'y paraît » reste aussi vrai au siècle actuel qu'il l'était au 19e et 20e.

# p.2

Malgré ses vulnérabilités et ses angoisses, la Russie reste un pays puissant qui parvient toujours à être **un concurrent américain** dans quelques domaines clés. Reconnaissant qu'un certain niveau de concurrence avec la Russie est inévitable, **les chercheurs de la RAND ont mené une évaluation qualitative des «options coûteuses» qui pourraient déséquilibrer et étendre la Russie.**

Les travaux s'appuient sur le concept de **concurrence stratégique à long terme développé pendant la guerre froide, dont certains sont originaires de la RAND.**

## ECONOMIC COST-IMPOSING MEASURES

**Expanding U.S. energy production** would stress Russia's economy, potentially constraining its government budget and, by extension, its defense spending. By adopting policies that expand world supply and depress global prices, the United States can limit Russian revenue. Doing so entails little cost or risk, produces second-order benefits for the U.S. economy, and does not need multilateral endorsement.

**Imposing deeper trade and financial sanctions** would also likely degrade the Russian economy, especially if such sanctions are comprehensive and multilateral. Thus, their effectiveness will depend on the willingness of other countries to join in such a process. But sanctions come with costs and, depending on their severity, considerable risks.

**Increasing Europe's ability to import gas from suppliers other than Russia** could economically extend Russia and buffer Europe against Russian energy coercion. Europe is slowly moving in this direction by building regasification plants for liquefied natural gas (LNG). But to be truly effective, this option would need global LNG markets to become more flexible than they already are and would need LNG to become more price-competitive with Russian gas.




SOURCE: United Nations (UN), *UN Comtrade Database*, electronic online database, 2017.

**Encouraging the emigration from Russia of skilled labor and well-educated youth** has few costs or risks and could help the United States and other receiving countries and hurt Russia, but any effects—both positive for receiving countries and negative for Russia—would be difficult to notice except over a very long period. This option also has a low likelihood of extending Russia.

| Economic Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expand U.S. energy production | High | High | Low |
| Impose deeper trade and financial sanctions | High | High | High |
| Increase Europe's ability to import LNG from sources other than Russia | Moderate | High | Moderate |
| Encourage emigration from Russia of skilled labor and well-educated youth | Low | Low | Low |

NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in green while a low likelihood of success is shaded in red. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report's authors.

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# p.3 : Mesures économiques

- **Élargissement de la production d'énergie aux États-Unis**
- **Imposer des sanctions commerciales et financières plus profondes**

  « leur efficacité dépendra de la volonté d'autres pays de participer à un tel processus »
- **Accroître la capacité de l'Europe à importer du gaz de fournisseurs autres que la Russie**
- **Encourager l'émigration de la Russie de main-d'œuvre qualifiée et de jeunes bien éduqués**

  « a peu de coûts ou de risques et pourrait aider les États-Unis et d'autres pays d'accueil et nuire à la Russie »

## GEOPOLITICAL COST-IMPOSING MEASURES

**Providing lethal aid to Ukraine** would exploit Russia's greatest point of external vulnerability. But any increase in U.S. military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would have significant advantages.

**Increasing support to the Syrian rebels** could jeopardize other U.S. policy priorities, such as combating radical Islamic terrorism, and could risk further destabilizing the entire region. Furthermore, this option might not even be feasible, given the radicalization, fragmentation, and decline of the Syrian opposition.

**Promoting liberalization in Belarus** likely would not succeed and could provoke a strong Russian response, one that would result in a general deterioration of the security environment in Europe and a setback for U.S. policy.

Syrian Democratic Forces trainees, representing an equal number of Arab and Kurdish volunteers, stand in formation at their graduation ceremony in northern Syria, August 9, 2017.

**Expanding ties in the South Caucasus**—competing economically with Russia—would be difficult because of geography and history.

**Reducing Russian influence in Central Asia** would be very difficult and could prove costly. Increased engagement is unlikely to extend Russia much economically and likely to be disproportionately costly for the United States.

**Flip Transnistria and expel the Russian troops from the region** would be a blow to Russian prestige, but it would also save Moscow money and quite possibly impose additional costs on the United States and its allies.

| Geopolitical Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Provide lethal aid to Ukraine | Moderate | High | High |
| Increase support to the Syrian rebels | Low | Moderate | High |
| Promote liberalization in Belarus | Low | High | High |
| Expand ties in the South Caucasus | Low | Low | Moderate |
| Reduce Russian influence in Central Asia | Low | Low | Moderate |
| Flipping Transnistria | Low | Low | Moderate |



# p.4 : Mesures géopolitiques

- **Fournir une aide létale à l'Ukraine**
  « exploiterait le plus grand point de vulnérabilité extérieure de la Russie. Mais toute augmentation des armes militaires à l'Ukraine devraient être soigneusement calibrée pour augmenter les coûts pour la Russie sans provoquer un conflit beaucoup plus large dans lequel la Russie, en raison de la proximité, aurait des avantages importants. »
- **Accroître le soutien aux rebelles syriens**
  « [mais] pourrait compromettre d'autres priorités politiques américaines, telles que la lutte contre le terrorisme islamique radical »
- **Réduire l'influence russe en Asie centrale**
  [les pays qui terminent par «-stan» et d'autres]

## IDEOLOGICAL AND INFORMATIONAL COST-IMPOSING MEASURES

**Diminishing faith in the Russian electoral system** would be difficult because of state control over most media sources. Doing so could increase discontent with the regime, but there are serious risks that the Kremlin could increase repression or lash out and pursue a diversionary conflict abroad that might run counter to Western interests.

**Creating the perception that the regime is not pursuing the public interest** could focus on widespread, large-scale corruption and further challenge the legitimacy of the state. But it is hard to assess whether political volatility and protests would lead to a more extended Russia—less able or inclined to threaten Western interests abroad—or to a Russia more inclined to lash out in retaliation or to distract, making this a high-risk option.

**Encouraging domestic protests and other nonviolent resistance** would focus on distracting or destabilizing the Russian regime and reducing the likelihood that it would pursue aggressive actions abroad, but the risks are high and it would be difficult for Western governments to directly increase the incidence or intensity of anti-regime activities in Russia.

**Undermining Russia's image abroad** would focus on diminishing Russian standing and influence, thus undercutting regime claims of restoring Russia to its former glory. Further sanctions, the removal of Russia from non-UN international forums, and boycotting such events as the World Cup could be implemented by Western states and would damage Russian prestige. But the extent to which these steps would damage Russian domestic stability is uncertain.

While none of these measures has a high probability of success, any or all of them would prey on the Russian regime's deepest anxieties and might be employed as a deterrent threat to diminish Russia's active disinformation and subversion campaigns abroad.



Muscovites protesting the war in Ukraine and Russia's support of separatism in the Crimea on the Circular Boulevards in Moscow on March 15, 2014.

| Ideological and Informational Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Diminish faith in the Russian electoral system | Low | Moderate | High |
| Create the perception that the regime is not pursuing the public interest | Moderate | Moderate | High |
| Encourage domestic protests and other nonviolent resistance | Low | Moderate | High |
| Undermine Russia's image abroad | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |



# p.5 : Mesures idéologiques & informationnelles

- **Diminuer la foi dans le système électoral russe**
  « serait difficile en raison du contrôle de l'État sur la plupart des sources médiatiques. »
- **Créer la perception que le régime ne poursuit pas l'intérêt public**
- **Encourager les manifestations nationales et autres résistances non violentes.**
  « se concentrerait sur la distraction ou la déstabilisation du régime russe et la réduction de la probabilité qu'il poursuive des actions agressives à l'étranger. »
- **Saper l'image de la Russie à l'étranger.**
  « De nouvelles sanctions, le retrait de la Russie des forums internationaux non-ONU et le boycott d'événements tels que la Coupe du monde pourraient être mis en œuvre par les États occidentaux et nuiraient au prestige russe. »

## AIR AND SPACE COST-IMPOSING MEASURES

**Reposturing bombers within easy striking range** of key Russian strategic targets has a high likelihood of success and would certainly get Moscow's attention and raise Russian anxieties; the costs and risks of this option are low as long as the bombers are based out of range of most of Russia's theater ballistic and ground-based cruise missiles.

**Reposturing fighters so that they are closer to their targets** than bombers as a way to achieve higher sortie rates to compensate for their smaller payloads would likely concern Moscow even more than reposturing bombers, but the likelihood of success is low and risks are high. Because each aircraft would need to fly multiple sorties during a conventional conflict, Russian leaders would

| Air and Space/Nuclear Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Option 1: Changing air and space force posture and operations | | | |
| Reposture bombers | High | Moderate | Low |
| Reposture fighters | Low | Moderate | High |
| Deploy additional tactical nuclear weapons | High | Low | High |
| Reposition U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense systems | Low | Low | Moderate |
| Option 2: Increasing aerospace research and development (R&D) | | | |
| Invest more in low-observable aircraft | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
| Invest more in autonomous or remotely piloted aircraft | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| Invest more in long-range strike aircraft and missiles | High | High | Moderate |
| Invest more in longer-range high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| Invest more in new electronic warfare technologies | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
| Focus on long-range, precision-guided conventional missiles (e.g., conventional prompt global strike) | Moderate | Moderate | High |
| Focus on space-based weapons | Low | Moderate | High |
| Focus on "spaceplanes" | Low to moderate | Moderate | High |
| Focus on small satellites | Low | Moderate | High |
| Option 3: Increasing air and missile components of the nuclear triad | | | |
| Break out of the nuclear arms control regime | Low | Moderate | High |

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# p.6 : Mesures dans l'air & dans l'espace

- **Bombardiers dans une plage de frappe facile**
  « sur les principaux objectifs stratégiques russes a de fortes chances de succès et attirerait certainement l'attention de Moscou et susciterait des inquiétudes russes »
- **Déployer des armes nucléaires tactiques supplémentaires**
- **Investir davantage dans des avions autonomes ou télépilotés**
- **Investir davantage dans les avions et missiles à longue portée**
- **Investir davantage dans les nouvelles technologies de guerre électronique**
- **Se concentrer sur les armes spatiales**
- **Se concentrer sur les petits satellites**
- **Sortir du régime de maîtrise des armements nucléaires**

## MARITIME COST-IMPOSING MEASURES

A U.S. sailor aboard the guided missile destroyer USS *Mustin* (DDG 89) fires a torpedo at a simulated target during Valiant Shield 2014 in the Pacific Ocean September 18, 2014.

**Increasing U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence** in Russia's operating areas could force Russia to increase its naval investments, diverting investments from potentially more dangerous areas. But the size of investment required to reconstitute a true blue-water naval capability makes it unlikely that Russia could be compelled or enticed to do so.

**Increasing naval R&D efforts** would focus on developing new weapons that allow U.S. submarines to threaten a broader set of targets or enhance their ability to threaten Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which could impose anti-submarine warfare costs on Russia. There are limited risks, but success depends on being able to develop these capabilities and on whether they are sufficiently capable of influencing Russian expenditures.

**Shifting nuclear posture toward SSBNs** would entail increasing the percentage of the U.S. nuclear triad assigned to SSBNs by increasing the size of that fleet. While it might force Russia to invest in capabilities that can operate in a blue-water environment in two oceans and would reduce risks to U.S. strategic posture, the option is unlikely to entice Russia into changing its strategy and, thus, extending itself.

**Checking the Black Sea buildup** would involve deploying strengthened North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) anti-access and area denial over the Black Sea—perhaps in the form of long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles—to drive up the cost of defending Russian bases in Crimea and lower the benefit to Russia of having seized this area. Russia would certainly mount a vigorous diplomatic and informational campaign to dissuade coastal NATO and non-NATO states from participating. Also, operating in the Black Sea is politically and logistically more difficult for the U.S. Navy than the Russian Navy; it is also more dangerous for the former in a conflict.

| Maritime Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Increase U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
| Increase naval R&D efforts | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
| Shift nuclear posture toward SSBNs | Low | Low | Low |
| Check the Black Sea buildup | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |



# p.8 : Mesures maritimes

- Augmentation de la posture et de la présence des forces navales américaines et alliées
- Augmentation des efforts de R&D navale
  « qui se concentrerait sur le développement de nouvelles armes qui permettent aux sous-marins américains de menacer un ensemble plus large d'objectifs »
- Déplacement de la posture nucléaire vers les SSBN (Sous-marins nucléaires balistiques)
- Contrôler la mer Noire

## LAND AND MULTIDOMAIN COST-IMPOSING MEASURES

**Increasing U.S. forces in Europe, increasing European NATO member ground capabilities, and deploying a large number of NATO forces on the Russian border** would likely have only limited effects on extending Russia. All the options would enhance deterrence, but the risks vary. A general increase in NATO ground force capabilities in Europe—including closing European NATO member readiness gaps and increasing the number of U.S. forces stationed in traditional locations in Western Europe—would have limited risks. But large-scale deployments on Russia's borders would increase the risk of conflict with Russia, particularly if perceived as challenging Russia's position in eastern Ukraine, Belarus, or the Caucasus.

**Increasing the size and frequency of NATO exercises in Europe may help to enhance readiness and deterrence, but it is unlikely to prompt a costly Russian response unless the exercises also send risky signals.** Large-scale NATO exercises held near Russia's borders and exercises that practice counterattack or offensive scenarios could be perceived as showing the intent and willingness to consider offensive operations. For example, a NATO exercise simulating a counterattack to retake NATO territory lost to advancing Russian forces might look like an exercise to prepare for an invasion of a piece of Russian territory, such as Kaliningrad.

**Developing but not deploying an intermediate-range missile** could bring Russia back into conformity with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty but could also prompt an acceleration of Russian missile programs. Withdrawing from that treaty and building the missiles but not deploying them in Europe would add little to U.S. capabilities and would probably prompt Russia to deploy such missiles itself—and, perhaps, invest more in ballistic missile defense. Taking the further step of deploying the missiles to Europe, assuming that NATO allies were willing, would also almost certainly prompt a Russian response, potentially involving substantial resources, or at least the diversion of substantial resources from other defense spending, though it is hard to assess what share would be directed toward defensive capabilities versus offensive or retaliatory ones.

**Incremental investments in new technologies** to counter Russian air defenses and increase U.S. long-range fires could significantly improve defense and deterrence while compelling increased Russian investment in countermeasures. Investments in more-revolutionary, next-generation technologies could have even greater effects, given the Russian concerns about new physical principles, but depending on the capability, such investments could also risk strategic stability by threatening the Russian regime and leadership security in a crisis.

# p.9 : Mesures sur le terrain

- Augmentation des forces américaines en Europe, augmentation des capacités terrestres des membres de l'OTAN et déploiement d'un grand nombre de forces de l'OTAN à la frontière russe
- Augmentation de la taille et de la fréquence des exercices de l'OTAN en Europe
- Investissements dans les nouvelles technologies

# p.11 :
# Implications pour l'armée

## IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY

Exercise Artemis Strike was a German-led tactical live-fire exercise with live Patriot and Stinger missiles at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Chania, Greece, from October 31 to November 9, 2017. More than 200 U.S. soldiers and approximately 650 German airmen participated in the realistic training within a combined construct, exercising the rigors associated with force projection and educating operators on their air missile defense systems.

The task of "extending Russia" need not fall primarily on the Army or even the U.S. armed forces as a whole. Indeed, the most promising ways to extend Russia—those with the highest benefit, the lowest risk, and greatest likelihood of success—likely fall outside the military domain. Russia is not seeking military parity with the United States and, thus, might simply choose not to respond to some U.S. military actions (e.g., shifts in naval presence); other U.S. military actions (e.g., posturing forces closer to Russia) could ultimately prove more costly to the United States than to Russia. Still, our findings have at least three major implications for the Army.

**1 The U.S. Army should rebuild its linguistic and analytical expertise on Russia.** Because Russia does pose a long-term threat, the Army needs to develop the human capital to engage in this strategic competition.

**2 The Army should consider investing and encouraging the other services to invest more in capabilities, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems, Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2, longer-range anti-air defense, and other systems designed to counter Russian anti-access and area denial capabilities.** The Army also might consider spending some R&D resources on less-mature, more-futuristic systems (e.g., swarm unmanned aerial vehicles or remote combat vehicles). While these measures would likely be insufficient in themselves to greatly extend Russia, they would benefit U.S. deterrence efforts and could augment a broader whole-of-government policy.

**3 Even if the Army were not directly involved in extending Russia per se, it would play a key role in mitigating the possible blowback.** All the options to extend Russia incur some risk. As a result, enhancing U.S. deterrence posture in Europe and increasing U.S. military capabilities (e.g., an enhanced Javelin or active protection systems for Army vehicles) might need to go hand in hand with any move to extend Russia, as a way of hedging against the chance of tensions with Russia escalating into conflict.

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**L'armée états-unienne devrait reconstruire son expertise linguistique & analytique sur la Russie**

« parce que la Russie représente une menace à long terme, l'armée doit développer le capital humain pour s'engager dans cette compétition stratégique.

L'armée pourrait également envisager de dépenser certaines ressources de R&D pour des systèmes moins matures et plus futuristes (par exemple, des véhicules aériens sans pilote ou des véhicules de combat à distance). »

# p.12 : Conclusions du rapport

## CONCLUSIONS

The most-promising options to "extend Russia" are those that directly address its vulnerabilities, anxieties, and strengths, exploiting areas of weakness while undermining Russia's current advantages. In that regard, Russia's greatest vulnerability, in any competition with the United States, is its economy, which is comparatively small and highly dependent on energy exports. Russian leadership's greatest anxiety stems from the stability and durability of the regime, and Russia's greatest strengths are in the military and info-war realms. The table below draws from the earlier tables to identify the most-promising options.

Most of the options discussed, including those listed here, are in some sense escalatory, and most would likely prompt some Russian counterescalation. Thus, besides the specific risks associated with each option, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. This means that every option must be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia will bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States will, both sides will have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is not a sufficient basis in most cases to consider the options discussed here. Rather, the options must be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation.

| Most-Promising Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expand U.S. energy production | High | High | Low |
| Impose deeper trade and financial sanctions | High | High | High |
| Increase U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
| Reposture bombers | High | Moderate | Low |
| Invest more in autonomous or remotely piloted aircraft | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| Invest more in long-range strike aircraft and missiles | High | High | Moderate |
| Invest more in longer-range HARMs | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| Invest more in new electronic warfare technologies | Moderate | Moderate | Low |

This brief describes work done in the RAND Arroyo Center documented in *Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground*, by James Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLuca, Forrest E. Morgan, Howard J. Shatz, and Brent Williams, RR-3063-A, 2019 (available at www.rand.org/t/RR3063). To view this brief online, visit www.rand.org/t/RB10014. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. RAND® is a registered trademark.



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RB-10014-A (2019)

**Les options les plus prometteuses pour "étendre la Russie" sont celles qui s'attaquent directement à ses vulnérabilités, à ses inquiétudes et à ses forces**, en exploitant les zones de faiblesse tout en sapant les avantages actuels de la Russie.

À cet égard, **la plus grande vulnérabilité de la Russie**, dans toute compétition avec les États-Unis, **est son économie**, qui est relativement petite et fortement dépendante des exportations d'énergie.

La plus grande inquiétude des dirigeants russes tient à la stabilité et à la pérennité du régime, et …

**Les plus grands atouts de la Russie se situent dans les domaines militaire et de l'infoguerre.**

# p.12 : Conclusions du rapport

## CONCLUSIONS

The most-promising options to "extend Russia" are those that directly address its vulnerabilities, anxieties, and strengths, exploiting areas of weakness while undermining Russia's current advantages. In that regard, Russia's greatest vulnerability, in any competition with the United States, is its economy, which is comparatively small and highly dependent on energy exports. Russian leadership's greatest anxiety stems from the stability and durability of the regime, and Russia's greatest strengths are in the military and info-war realms. The table below draws from the earlier tables to identify the most-promising options.

Most of the options discussed, including those listed here, are in some sense escalatory, and most would likely prompt some Russian counterescalation. Thus, besides the specific risks associated with each option, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. This means that every option must be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia will bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States will, both sides will have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is not a sufficient basis in most cases to consider the options discussed here. Rather, the options must be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation.

| Most-Promising Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expand U.S. energy production | High | High | Low |
| Impose deeper trade and financial sanctions | High | High | High |
| Increase U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
| Reposture bombers | High | Moderate | Low |
| Invest more in autonomous or remotely piloted aircraft | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| Invest more in long-range strike aircraft and missiles | High | High | Moderate |
| Invest more in longer-range HARMs | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| Invest more in new electronic warfare technologies | Moderate | Moderate | Low |

This brief describes work done in the RAND Arroyo Center documented in *Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground*, by James Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLuca, Forrest E. Morgan, Howard J. Shatz, and Brent Williams, RR-3063-A, 2019 (available at www.rand.org/t/RR3063). To view this brief online, visit www.rand.org/t/RB10014. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. RAND® is a registered trademark.



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RB-10014-A (2019)

**Les mesures les plus prometteuses sont :**

- **Augmenter la production d'énergie aux États-Unis**
- **Imposer des sanctions commerciales et financières plus sévères [à la Russie]**

**………………………………………………………………………………………**

- **Augmenter la posture et la présence des forces navales américaines et alliées**
- **Bombardiers**
- **Investir dans des avions autonomes ou télépilotés**
- **Investir dans des avions de frappe à longue portée et des missiles**
- **Investir dans les « HARMs »** (missiles anti-radiations à grande vitesse) **à plus longue portée**
- **Investir dans les nouvelles technologies de guerre électronique**

**Zbiniew Brzezinski**
**soutient les moudjahidines d'Afghanistan pour piéger et anéantir l'URSS dès 1979 …**

World Socialist Web Site 13 juin 2017

# Zbigniew Brzezinski, l'architecte de la catastrophe en Afghanistan, meurt à 89 ans

Zbigniew Brzezinski, conseiller à la sécurité du président Jimmy Carter et partisan de longue date d'une stratégie agressive pour affirmer l'hégémonie américaine […] **fut utilisé par David Rockfeller (mort 2 mois plus tôt) pour diriger la Commission trilatérale, une instance créée dans le but de coordonner la stratégie impérialiste entre Washington, l'Europe occidentale et le Japon**.

Interrogé par ***Le Nouvel Observateur*** en janvier 1998 pour savoir s'il regrettait la collaboration et l'armement par la CIA [pour des milliards de dollars] de groupes islamistes radicaux, incluant Al-Qaïda, dans la fomentation de la guerre en Afghanistan, Brzezinski a répondu sur un ton méprisant : « **Qu'est-ce qui est plus important pour l'histoire du monde? Les talibans ou la chute de l'Empire soviétique ?»**

# … il est aussi président du conseil consultatif de la RAND Corporation !

RAND CORPORATION

28 mai 2017

**Michael Rich & James Thomson, présidents & chefs de la direction de RAND Corporation :**

« **Zbigniew Brzezinski a apporté ses talents à RAND en tant que président du conseil consultatif du Centre pour les politiques publiques du Moyen-Orient de RAND. Au cours de sa carrière, il a été mentor et ami de nombreux membres du personnel de RAND.**
Zbig était un fonctionnaire exemplaire qui maîtrisait à la fois les détails stratégiques et opérationnels de la politique de sécurité nationale. Il a combiné une compréhension sophistiquée de l'histoire avec un engagement profond en faveur de la liberté et de la dignité humaine et a exprimé ces valeurs avec une clarté inégalée. Il nous manquera beaucoup. »

… mais aussi auteur du Grand Echiquier, publié en 1997.





tante, l'OTAN va commencer à avancer sur la question de leur intégration et sur celle de la Roumanie qui pourrait devenir effective en 2005 (OTAN). Durant cette période, les autres États des Balkans devraient pouvoir satisfaire aux critères de candidature.

3. L'intégration des États balkaniques pourrait amener la Suède et la Finlande à envisager leur candidature à l'OTAN.

4. Au cours de la période suivante (soit de 2005 à 2010), l'Ukraine pourrait à son tour être en situation d'entamer des négociations en vue de rejoindre l'UE et l'OTAN. Cela exige des progrès dans les réformes et, à l'extérieur, une meilleure perception de son identité centro-européenne.

Pendant la même période, il est vraisemblable que la collaboration franco-germano-polonaise, au sein de l'Union européenne et de l'OTAN se sera approfondie, spécialement en matière de défense. Elle pourrait devenir le noyau occidental d'un large système de sécurité, embrassant la Russie ainsi que l'Ukraine. L'Allemagne et la Pologne ayant toutes deux un intérêt géopolitique particulier à l'indépendance ukrainienne, on peut tout à fait envisager que cette dernière soit, par étapes, cooptée comme quatrième partenaire d'une relation privilégiée. En 2010, la collaboration franco-germano-polono-ukrainienne, engageant quelque 230 millions de personnes, pourrait devenir la colonne vertébrale géostratégique de l'Europe (voir carte p. 119).

Une question essentielle se pose : ce scénario se déroulera-t-il dans un environnement apaisé ou dans un contexte de tensions croissantes avec la Russie ? Il est trop tôt pour donner une réponse. Cependant, la Russie, aussi souvent que nécessaire, devrait recevoir l'assurance que les portes de l'Europe lui restent ouvertes. Et, au-delà, que sa participation future à un nouveau système de sécurité transeurasien est envisageable. Des liens de coopération renforceraient la crédibilité de ce message. Ils pourraient se nouer dans tous les domaines et exigent, dès à présent, une attitude volontariste de l'Europe. (Dans le chapitre suivant, nous discuterons dans le détail les relations entre la Russie et l'Europe, et le rôle de l'Ukraine à cet égard.)

Si l'Europe réussit à s'unir et à s'élargir, et si, dans le même temps, la Russie parvient à se démocratiser et à se moderniser,

Ukraine et Russie dans l'OTAN.





Après 2010 : la colonne vertébrale de la sécurité européenne

le moment viendra où cette dernière possédera les qualifications requises pour avoir des relations plus organiques avec l'Europe. En retour, cette nouvelle étape mettrait à l'ordre du jour la fusion du système de sécurité transatlantique avec un système eurasien transcontinental. Dans les faits, la question de l'adhésion formelle de la Russie ne devrait pas se poser avant longtemps. C'est précisément pourquoi il ne faut pas lui fermer les portes.

Pour conclure : la fin de l'Europe de Yalta ne doit à aucun prix nous ramener à l'Europe de Versailles. Ce serait une régression vers les querelles entre États-nations. La partition du continent est effacée. Ce devrait être le point de départ de l'élargissement de l'Europe et de son unification, renforcées par l'ouverture de l'OTAN à de nouveaux membres et par des liens constructifs de sécurité avec la Russie. En conséquence, l'ob-

… mais aussi auteur du Grand Echiquier, publié en 1997.





jectif géostratégique central de l'Amérique en Europe peut se résumer très simplement : elle vise à consolider, grâce à un partenariat transatlantique plus équilibré, sa tête de pont sur le continent eurasien. Ainsi, l'Europe élargie pourra servir de tremplin pour instaurer en Eurasie un ordre international fondé sur la démocratie et la coopération.

# Conclusion :

**Pour diriger nos pays de l'intérieur, on a**

McKinsey & Company

**Et pour les diriger de l'extérieur, on a**

RAND CORPORATION

*Elle est pas belle, la démocratie occidentale ?*